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Abstract
The availability of a range of new psychotropic agents raises the possibility that these will be used for
enhancement purposes (smart pills, happy pills, and pep pills). The enhancement debate soon raises questions in
philosophy of medicine and psychiatry (eg, what is a disorder?), and this debate in turn raises fundament questions
in philosophy of language, science, and ethics. In this paper, a naturalistic conceptual framework is proposed for
addressing these issues. This framework begins by contrasting classical and critical concepts of categories, and then
puts forward an integrative position that is based on cognitive-affective research. This position can in turn be used
to consider the debate between pharmacological Calvinism (which may adopt a moral metaphor of disorder) and
psychotropic utopianism (which may emphasize a medical metaphor of disorder). I argue that psychiatric
treatment of serious psychiatric disorders is justified, and that psychotropics are an acceptable kind of intervention.
The use of psychotropics for sub-threshold phenomena requires a judicious weighing of the relevant facts (which
are often sparse) and values.
Introduction
Although psychotropics have been used for medicinal,
recreational, and spiritual purposes since the dawn of
humanity, the science of psychopharmacology is a rela-
tively new one. In recent decades, however, there have
been significant advances in understanding brain-mind
structures and mechanisms, and a range of novel psy-
chotropics have come to market. The availability of
these agents raises the possibility that they will be used
for enhancement purposes; that “smart pills” will be
used to promote learning and clarify thinking, “happy
pills” to increase mood and improve temperament, and
“pep pills” to increase energy and maximize motivation.
The debate on so-called cosmetic psychopharmacology
pits pharmacological Calvinism (which emphasizes the
negative aspects of having a pill for every ill) against
psychotropic utopianism (which underscore the positive
aspects of enhancements). This debate immediately
raises key questions in philosophy of medicine and psy-
chiatry - in particular, what is a medical disorder, and
what is a psychiatric disorder? These questions in turn
raise fundament issues in philosophy of language,
science, and ethics. In this paper, a naturalistic
conceptual framework is proposed for addressing these
issues and cosmetic psychopharmacology. This frame-
work begins by contrasting classical and critical con-
cepts of categories, and then puts forward an integrative
position that is based on cognitive-affective research.
Before outlining this approach, however, let us con-
sider 3 patient vignettes:
• Adam (aged 20) has severe social anxiety disorder
with comorbid depression. As a child he had selec-
tive mutism, and had to repeat a year of schooling.
Major depression began in adolescence. Social anxi-
ety has meant that he was unable to go to college,
or seek work. He has been in several psychothera-
pies, without clear effect. Treatment with an antide-
pressant has not yet been attempted.
• Beth (aged 24) has felt uncomfortable in social
situations since adolescence. She worked as a secre-
tary in a small town, and did fine. However, when
her family moved to the city, and worked in a larger
company, she was required to take part in small
group activities. This led to significant distress, and
she often thought of stopping work. She has never
heard of social phobia, nor sought treatment.
• Cliff (aged 28) characterizes himself as shy. He
works in a marketing company, and feels that his
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presentations are not nearly as good as they could
be. He gets anxious, and stumbles more than others.
It is important for him to come across more
smoothly. He read about the efficacy of paroxetine
for social anxiety disorder, and presented for treat-
ment, wanting to try this medication.
Classical vs critical approaches to categorization
An immediate question raised by these vignettes is the
central question of philosophy of medicine and psychia-
try, “what is a disorder?” A classical and a critical
response to this question can be differentiated. Neither
of these positions aligns with the work of any particular
author, and each involves oversimplification of a vast lit-
erature; nevertheless, the contrast may have some heur-
istic value for developing an integrative conceptual
framework [1].
A classical position argues that it is possible to
develop necessary and sufficient criteria for defining not
only disorder, but any particular category of psycho-
pathology, such as depression (Adam), social phobia
(Beth), or shyness (Cliff). After all, the concept of a
square can be defined using necessary and sufficient cri-
teria. Similarly, a disorder can be defined in essentialist
terms, for example, as a malfunction. Such a position
has roots in Plato, and can be traced through the work
of the early Wittgenstein and logical positivism. A clas-
sical approach to categories holds that meaning can be
fully specified in terms of our direct knowledge of the
world, and subsequent definitions and logic.
A critical position on the other hand, argues that the
definition of psychiatric disorders varies from place to
place, and time to time. Similarly, when we consider the
meaning of a construct such as a weed, the key consid-
erations are the social practices of gardeners, and these
in turn reflect a particular context. Thus, our concepts
of disorder are best understood as social constructions.
Such a position has roots in the work of writers like
Vico and Herder, and can be traced through the work
of the later Wittgenstein, and much continental philoso-
phy. A critical approach argues that language reflects a
speakers’ way of life, and meaning cannot be reduced to
formal rules.
An integrative position emphasizes that a range of
cognitive-affective data can be used to understand the
category of disorders. Although categories reflect social
activities, humans are able to investigate their underly-
ing structures and mechanisms [2], and so can reason-
ably debate classifications. Birds, for example, fall into
those that are viewed as typical (eg robins), that those
are less typical (eg owls) and those that are atypical (eg
ostriches). Nevertheless, various data indicate that
ostriches can validly be classified as birds. Such a posi-
tion again has early roots, and has been articulated by
various modern philosophers [3]. An integrative
approach argues that categories are embodied in our
brain-minds, and in our social activities, but that they
can be reasonably debated.
Although it might be useful to use empirical data to
assess which disorders are seen as typical, less typical,
and typical, examples of these come readily to mind. In
typical disorders (eg infection, posttraumatic stress dis-
order), metaphors of warfare/contamination, of impedi-
ment/breakdown, or of imbalance are used. In these
MEDICAL metaphors, disorder is caused by an external
agent, which treatment then addresses. In atypical disor-
ders (eg obesity, impulsive-aggression), these metaphors
fit less well (eg the role of external agents is less clear,
or treatment encourages personal responsibility). Thus a
MORAL metaphor may also be employed.
Implications: Entities, accounts, values
The contrast drawn here between classical and critical
concepts of disorders leads in turn to a range of funda-
mental questions about the entities in the world, about
accounts of these entities, and about the way in which
we value them. A brief paper cannot due full justice to
the broad range of metaphysical, epistemological, and
ethical literature that is relevant to these questions.
Nevertheless, there may be some heuristic value in con-
trasting certain key classical versus critical positions,
and putting forward an integrative position based on
cognitive-affective data [1].
a) Entities
A position which conceptualizes categories in essential-
ist terms leads in turn to a classical approach to a range
of other entities that are relevant to debates about cos-
metic psychopharmacology. These include personal
identity, emotion, and psychotropics. A classical view
may attempt to define the self in an essentialist way
(consider Descartes’ view of the soul), to contrast emo-
tion clearly with reason (a cognitivist view regards emo-
tions in terms of beliefs and desires), and to delineate
rigorously medications from enhancements (the former
are used to treat medical disorders, the latter are used
for other purposes).
In contrast, a view which regards categories as social
constructions leads in turn to a critical approach to this
range of entities. A critical view may argue that the self
is not fixed and immutable (consider views of the self as
narrative), may emphasize the non-essentialist nature of
emotion (emphasizing, for example, feelings as socially
constructed), and may conclude that there are no rigor-
ous boundaries between psychiatric drugs, illicit sub-
stances, and nutraceuticals (the distinctions are porous,
and vary from time to time and place to place). (There
is a tendency, though, for critical authors to regard
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psychiatric drugs as non-progressive technologies of the
self, while viewing illicit substances as promising psyche-
delics and entheogens).
A perspective which regards categories as social con-
structed, but also as potentially informed by knowledge
of their underlying structures and mechanisms, leads in
turn to an integrative approach to the self, to emotion,
and to medication. While the self is certainly auto-con-
structed, it is possible to make judgments about the
authenticity of particular selves (for example, a patient
with depression may regard their current self as
inauthentic). Emotion and reason are intertwined in
complex ways (and it is possible to determine in a rea-
sonable way whether social anxiety is appropriate or
not). While social convention draws particular bound-
aries between different kinds of psychotropic, it turns
out that specific brain-mind structures and mechanisms
determine whether or not such molecules are effective,
lead to dependence, or have other adverse events.
b) Accounts
A classical position can also be formulated for addres-
sing explanations of the world in general, and of the
brain-mind in particular. Positivist philosophers, for
example, have emphasized the uniformity of the laws of
nature, arguing that the scientific method involves indu-
cing laws from empirical data. Similarly, behaviourism,
symbolic cognitivism, and certain approaches within
psychoanalysis have emphasized the importance of
attempting to find regular laws which cover brain-mind
phenomena and psychiatric treatments. A classical
approach within psychopharmacology views the placebo
effect as “noise” which must subtracted out in order to
see the real “signals” in the data. Finally, a classical
approach to evolutionary psychiatry emphasizes evolved
mental modules, and their dysfunction in disorder.
In contrast, a critical position argues that when it
comes to human phenomena, including brain-mind phe-
nomena, our approach must focus on understanding
(verstehen) rather than explanation (erklären). A focus
on narratives and their interpretation is key in the
human sciences. Similarly, critics of behaviourism, situ-
ated cognitivism, and hermeneutic approaches within
psychoanalysis have emphasized the importance of
human understanding and of social context in approach-
ing both human psychopathology and clinical interven-
tion. A critical approach may emphasize the strength of
the placebo effect, and the way in which it points to the
importance of meaning in the doctor-patient relation-
ship. A critical approach may argue that humans have
evolved to use language, and that what counts as human
nature varies from time to time and place to place.
A perspective which emphasizes both verstehen and
erklären in approaching complex brain-mind
phenomena arguably leads to more integrative accounts.
Psychiatry has developed increasingly sophisticated
accounts of psychopathology and of treatment, incorpor-
ating both top-down perspectives (emphasizing social
context) and bottom-up accounts (emphasizing genes
and proteins). Similarly, a complex account of placebo
and nocebo responses is now possible; this includes
awareness not only of the importance of the doctor-
patient relationship, but also the way in which this is
mediated by specific neurocircuitry. Evolutionary theory
both contributes to the richness of our scientific
accounts, including our account of human nature, and
simultaneously clarifies that humans have socially con-
structed natures.
c) Values
A classical approach would take the view that decisions
about ethics in general and bioethics in particular can
be made on the basis of moral laws. Thinkers from
Plato through Kant have described the rationality of
such universal and fixed rules, with more recent philo-
sophers such as Rawls viewing moral theory as a kind of
grammar [4]. On the basis of a determination about
whether a relevant condition involves say a dysfunction
(a matter of fact), and a determination about whether
say maximum benefit for the community is being
achieved (a matter of value), for example, a principled
decision can be made as to whether or not to treat. In
this classic view, modern bioethics is able to resolve
questions raised by the practice of medicine, including
problems raised by new technologies, by means of moral
rules, which apply universally, and sustain the important
distinction between facts and values.
In contrast, a critical position emphasizes that such a
view is unrealizable given that decisions about ethics
and bioethics reflect the concerns and values of the par-
ticular historical and geographical contexts in which
they are made. Hegel, for example, argued that a sys-
tems of laws loses its meaning when attempts are made
to abstract it from its grounding in the ethical life of a
particular historical community. Emotional reactions are
normal and valuable phenomena, our constructs (or
“idioms”) of distress are culture-bound, and such dis-
tress need not necessarily be medicalized. Decisions
about ethics and bioethics reflect the concerns and
values of the particular historical and geographical con-
texts in which they are made. A close examination of
the words and metaphors used in moral reasoning and
of the nature of bioethics refutes the notion of a fact-
value distinction.
An integrative position argues that insofar as decisions
about ethics and bioethics are informed by universal
biologically-based considerations there exists the poten-
tial for minimal standards of agreement about ethics
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and about values, and it is possible to debate reasonably
in order to ensure that good bioethics decisions are
reached. A naturalist ethics can be traced to Aristotle,
who as a biologist attempted to give an account of the
good that was both local and particular, and yet also
cosmic and universal [5]. For example, there is near uni-
versal agreement that when physicians relieve pain this
is a good thing, and yet it is also possible to argue rea-
sonably for the importance of not relieving pain or suf-
fering in particular contexts. Naturalist positions range
from a broad approach (which holds that a naturalist
approach to philosophical inquiry in general is adequate
for moral philosophy) to a narrower view (which holds
that there are natural moral facts and properties). Here
it is necessary only to highlight the complexity of facts
about the human species and the way these interact
with human values, noting that this is consistent with a
non-reductionistic naturalism.
Three vignettes
With this conceptual framework in mind, let us return
to our 3 vignettes.
a) Adam
From a classical perspective, Adam clearly suffers from a
well-described medical disorder (depression). We can
readily make objective assessments of his abnormal
sense of self, his low mood, and of the effects of particu-
lar antidepressant medications. Fortunately psychiatry
has been able to demonstrate that depression is asso-
ciated with biochemical disturbances, and that antide-
pressant agents are able to improve symptoms. The
standard moral rules of good medicine apply also in
psychiatry, and there is a clear-cut case for treating
Adam’s medical disorder with modern psychotropic
agents as soon as possible.
From a critical perspective, there are many other ways
of construing Adam. A diagnosis of depression tells us
much about the particular social context of Western
medicine, but relatively little about the nature of the dis-
tress which he is suffering. To understand fully his self,
his mood, and his response to intervention, we need to
address the nature of his circumstances and the mean-
ing of his response. Indeed, this is the role of the clini-
cian; to assist Adam to understand his context, and to
help him construct a response to it. Medicalization of
this process is not necessarily useful, and whatever
approach we take in helping Adam reflects the particu-
larity of our own value system.
From an integrative perspective, we can debate
rationally whether or not Adam has a disorder, and
similarly assess the extent to which his self-alteration,
mood, and response to medication are consistent with
a MEDICAL metaphor. Certainly, depression is
associated with significant disability and suffering, and
current interventions are effective and cost-efficient.
Furthermore, we increasingly understand the specific
structures and mechanisms which underlie depression,
and the way in which interventions act to normalize
such structures and mechanisms. While moral deci-
sion-making cannot be reduced to algorithms, neither
is it entirely relativistic; a reasonable decision to treat
Adam emerges from a consideration of the relevant
data and values.
b) Beth
When it comes to Beth, many have argued that social
anxiety disorder (or social phobia), like depression, is a
medical disorder that deserves clinical intervention.
From a classical perspective, social anxiety disorder like
depression can be thought of in terms of a “chemical
imbalance”. At the same time, critics have argued that
the concept of social anxiety disorder represents “disease
mongering”, that there is no evidence that social anxiety
disorder involves real dysfunction, and that we need to
be sceptical about the need for medical intervention.
Certainly, social anxiety disorder appears somewhat dif-
ferent from acute depression, in that it is often a lifelong
condition that alters the very nature of the self. My own
view is that there now a considerable set of data which
highlights the suffering and disability of those with
social anxiety disorder, points to underlying psychobio-
logical alterations, and emphasizes the efficacy and cost-
efficiency of treatment. Thus an integrated approach
supports the validity of using a MEDICAL metaphor for
social anxiety disorder. Such a view is equally accepting
of both pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy.
c) Cliff
A classical view of medicine has tended to focus on dis-
ease rather than on physical or mental well-being. One
reason for this may be the difficulty in finding consen-
sus on what might constitute a decrease in well-being
and in reliably measuring subtle forms of decreased
well-being. There are, however, also ethical arguments
for making a distinction between doctoring (treating
dysfunction) and schmoctering (focusing on enhance-
ment) and avoiding the latter [6]. Some authors [7,8]
argue on the basis of the principles of distributive justice
that society need only provide resources for the former.
Others (bioconservatives) argue that when medicine
focuses on enhancement, it risks upsetting the natural
order of things. In the United States, the President’s
Council on Bioethics has argued that “[T]he naturalness
of means matters. It lies not in the fact that the assisting
drugs or devices are artefacts, but in the danger of vio-
lating or deforming the nature of human agency ... bio-
technology interventions act directly on the human
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body and mind to bring about their effects on a passive
subject [9].
From a critical perspective, enhancement technologies,
ranging from cosmetic surgery to cosmetic psychophar-
macology, reinforce particular social constructions and
values. The extension of medicine to include enhance-
ment technologies is consistent with its role in decreas-
ing social deviance, and is problematic insofar as it
focuses on pathology and ignores resilience, overempha-
sizes technology and dehumanizes people, and ignores
our overall physical, psychological, and spiritual well-
being. Some psychotherapies may be useful in fostering
self-knowledge and even self-transcendence [10], and
some psychotropics (eg substances) may be of interest
insofar as they allow an interrogation and deconstruc-
tion of “reality”. However, just as cosmetic surgery rein-
forces particular social values (for example, equating
women’s looks with their value), so cosmetic psycho-
pharmacology acts primarily as a conservative force,
promoting inauthenticity and interfering with self-
understanding. As Murray [11], for example, writes
“Medicine is now the problem of the self; and medicine,
we are told is the necessary solution to the problem - a
problem that this medical discourse has in fact secretly
produced and systematically obscured ...the modern self
remains constrained by a medical morality: I am morally
remiss, my life is a life unworthy of living if I fail to sub-
mit to medical examinations, to doctors’ and psychia-
trists’ recommendations”.
Williams [12] compares hyper-traditional societies,
where there has been no exposure to contrasting views,
with our modern world, where there is increasing expo-
sure to a range of opinions. In a hyper-traditional
society, there may be little reflexive thought on where
the boundaries of treatment should lie, the natural order
of things is obvious. But since the dawn of the modern
world, the lines between doctoring and schmoctoring
have been open to debate, and ever shifting. An integra-
tive perspective would be wary of any attempt to find a
universal rule that differentiated between treatment and
enhancement, or conversely, that rejected any possibility
of a reasonable decision about where this line should be
drawn. Again, the argument can be made that for any
particular individual, conceptual and empirical work can
help determine what the best intervention is, at any par-
ticular point in time. Still, although advances in biotech-
nology may be useful for a specific individual, the
practices that they bring into play may also come with
important costs.
There is a tension in Western society between values
of self-improvement and self-creation, which would
encourage people to use novel technologies including
medical enhancement, and values around tradition and
nature and about true self-discovery which argue that
such changes are not authentic [6,13]. As Parens writes,
“As one side emphasises our obligation to remember
that life is a gift and that we need to learn to let things
be, the other emphasizes our obligation to transform
that gift and to exhibit our creativity” [14]. In Huxley’s
“Island” the moksha-medicine suggests the possibility of
using medication to enhance authenticity, but in his
“Brave New World” soma serves to illustrate how psy-
chopharmacological enhancement can be dehumanizing
[15]. Given the emphasis that we place on effort in
assigning responsibility for achievement, many view
enhancement as representing diminished agency on the
part of the person whose achievement is enhanced. San-
del, a member of the President’s Council, counter-argues
however that both enhancement technologies, and also
particularly high pressure kinds of parenting (or “hyper-
parenting”), represent not so much a loss of agency, but
rather hyperagency - an aspiration to remake nature,
including human nature [16]. Mastery over nature, and
self-improvement, have obvious benefits. But there is
also the risk that viewing our talents solely as achieve-
ments for which we are responsible, leads to hubris
about ourselves (we are self-made and self-sufficient
rather than merely fortunate), and a lack of solidarity
with others less fortunate (who are deserving of their
fate rather than merely unfortunate) [16].
Johnson has argued persuasively that moral reasoning
is a special case of general (cognitive-affective) reason-
ing, and therefore must rely not so much on algorithmic
rules, as on the use of embodied metaphors [17]. It is
precisely when our concepts of what is natural are chal-
lenged, for example, by new technologies, that the ques-
tion of which metaphor to apply becomes particularly
crucial. Thus, in the case of cosmetic psychopharmacol-
ogy (and other new technologies), we are left with the
question of whether the MEDICAL metaphor of self-
treatment (typically applied when some kind of unna-
tural breakdown occurs) or the MORAL metaphor of
self-discovery (typically applied to everyday or appar-
ently natural life), or a combination of the two, is more
appropriate. Life often presents us with conflicting
moral solutions that cannot be hierarchically ordered by
any universal principle. Those using psychotropics may
find themselves using different metaphors at different
times. Indeed, in medical practice in general, and in cos-
metic psychopharmacology in particular, the right bal-
ance between over-use and under-use of medical
metaphors, remains a matter of judgment.
Routine vaccination and fluoride supplementation are
paradigmatic of health care interventions that are under-
taken in healthy children to strengthen them (rather
than to treat a disorder), and that are now correctly
viewed as good doctoring. Similarly, folic acid is added
to food to prevent neural tube defects in newborns, and
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vitamin supplementation may be recommended in some
healthy adults. Although the benefits of such practices
have on balance been enormous, there have been signifi-
cant costs for particular individuals (for example, those
who have serious adverse reactions to vaccination). As
interventions for high cholesterol and high blood pres-
sure have been introduced, and become cheaper, so our
cut-points for deciding who to treat have become less
and less conservative. In the past it has been argued
that antidepressants are only useful in those with major
depression, but there is now evidence that minor disor-
ders are accompanied by significant disability and also
respond to these agents. The risk-benefit of such inter-
ventions can be calculated using statistical measures
such as numbers needed to treat and numbers needed
to harm.
Although the analysis here has focus on disorder, ana-
logous considerations would argue that no essentialist
definition of health is possible, and its boundaries must
be decided as reasonably as possible. The construct of
“well-being” is often a component of our cognitive-affec-
tive maps for decision-making and moral judgments [3],
and may be more relevant to considering “enhance-
ments” rather than “treatments”. Given that humans do
have some design flaws, and given advances in pharma-
ceuticals and psychotropics, it is not unlikely that more
and more of these agents will be appropriately pre-
scribed to more and more people for the purposes of
well-being. It is not at all clear that there is any a priori
ethical reason for rejecting a shift from a hyper-tradi-
tional view of doctoring, and moving to one that allows
the employment of biotechnological advances to
improve well-being [18]. Arguments that such advances
threaten the natural order, for example, may simply
reflect culture-specific views about what sort of condi-
tions are needed for a good life [19].
On the other hand, there may be important costs
associated with this kind of extension of doctoring.
Given how well humans have been designed by evolu-
tion, the difficulties facing innovative science, and the
high placebo response in those who suffer only mild
impairment, it is hard to generate data showing that
interventions to improve physical or psychological well-
being are in fact effective and cost-effective. A growing
empirical literature on happiness and well-being [20]
supports the view that gaining achievement at the cost
of social connectedness is ultimately experienced as dis-
advantageous. Furthermore, raising expectations about
the existence and value of enhancement technologies
may be one of the reasons for the so-called “paradox of
health” in contemporary societies; where populations
that are in fact well, but also well-informed about
pathology, complain more about disorder than unwell
but uninformed groups [21]. Thus, the employment of
biotechnological advances to improve well-being may at
times be bad doctoring.
Neither evolutionary theory, nor blanket ethical prin-
ciples, provide sufficient guidance for deciding on
whether or not to medically intervene. There is general
agreement that prescribing psychotropics for depression
is useful, that providing psychotropics to an abused
woman in order to take away the pain in her current
abusive relationship without supporting attempts to
change or discontinue the relationship is bad doctoring,
and that using steroids with terrible side effects to
enhance athletic performance is bad schmoctoring. On
the other hand, in some cases it would seem good judg-
ment to try an “enhancement” in the hope that it would
in fact serve as a useful “treatment”. This position is
consistent with a realist view that emphasizes an indivi-
dualist approach to clinical decision-making, and that is
neither overly optimistic nor unduly pessimistic about
biotechnological advances.
Just as the media cannot be held wholly responsible
for modern ideals of beauty, so the pharmaceutical
industry cannot be said to have entirely manufactured
our concepts of either psychiatric disorder or mental fit-
ness. On the other hand, just as it is important to inter-
rogate media constructs of beauty and to offer
alternatives, so it is crucial to assess the extent to which
the claims of the pharmaceutical, alternative, and indi-
genous medicines industries and other promoters of
psychotropics go beyond the relevant science, and to
offer a range of alternatives to those who may under-
standably want to use these agents to change their lives
for the better. Psychopharmacology has the potential to
liberate us by reducing the limits imposed on us by dis-
order, but to imprison us by imposing societal demands
[22]. In weighing up alternatives, it is certainly impor-
tant to remember the excesses of past marketing cam-
paigns, and the overoptimism of researchers and
clinicians about novel breakthroughs in psychopharma-
cology [23]. At the same time, and for particular indivi-
duals, at particular times, there is no reason to remain
completely closed to the possibility that a specific psy-
chotropic will turn out to be remarkably helpful. Good
clinical practice invariably involves the kind of equipoise
that comes from successfully balancing the perennial
tensions described in this paper between the objective
and subjective, explanation and understanding, and con-
flicting values.
We now know that specific genetic variants, in inter-
action with particular environments, determine set-
points in various neuronal circuits. We can no longer
infer that all people experience pain or anxiety in the
same way. Similarly, for particular individuals, certain
psychotropics may be useful; people with the val-val
polymorphism of the catechol-0-methyltransferase
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(COMT) gene are characterized by lower prefrontal
dopamine levels and worse performance on working
memory tasks, and may do well on certain medications
- whereas people with the met-met COMT polymorph-
ism have higher prefrontal dopamine levels and better
performance, and may respond less well to the same
agents [24]. On the basis of existing cognitive-affective
science it is possible to predict that in the future, physi-
cians and psychopharmacologists will obtain detailed
profiling of patients’ genetic variants, and offer an indi-
vidualized battery of medications and psychotropics.
There is the possibility that this will be done not merely
to reduce conditions such as social anxiety and impul-
sivity, but also to increase well-being and enhance
cognition.
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize the
complexity of our genes and their interactions, the unin-
tended consequences of medication use, and the difficul-
ties of coming up with elixirs that can outdo our
evolutionary design. An intervention that acts on only a
few receptor targets may ultimately affect multiple pro-
cesses in unpredictable ways. Just like the earlier “clini-
cal gaze” [25], so the more recent “molecular gaze”
[11,26] has its limitations. Indeed, despite much back-
slapping about the value of current psychopharmacol-
ogy, there has also been a great deal of exaggeration
[23]. It is notable that currently available medications all
work via only a few mechanisms, reflecting how difficult
it is to make real breakthroughs in our pharmacopoeia.
Similarly, current medications act on a fairly narrow
range of phenomena (primarily mood and anxiety), and
are relatively unhelpful for changing a range of other
traits that may play a role in determining well-being (eg
empathy). Again, to date, it is not yet clear that available
agents are better than, say, caffeine, or exercise, as cog-
nitive enhancers. Thus, despite the already widespread
use of psychotropics to improve well-being and enhance
cognition, only time will tell how valuable for humans
the field of cosmetic psychopharmacology will ultimately
be.
The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)
deserve particular mention, as they have been key to
this debate since the work of Kramer [27]. It should be
emphasized that to date there is relatively little empirical
data on the use of psychotropics such as SSRIs in
healthy volunteers. It is interesting that some controlled
research demonstrates subtle changes in emotional pro-
cessing and social behaviour in normals, sometimes out-
side of the awareness of subjects. Nevertheless, closer
examination of such phenomena, as well as of the use of
SSRIs in those with more significant symptomatology
(even if it did not meet criteria for “major depression”
or similar disorders) would be necessary to determine
whether it was worthwhile or not. Currently there is
insufficient evidence to argue that administration of an
SSRI to healthy subjects results in increased well-being
[28]. Conversely, there is some evidence that SSRIs can
flip predisposed people into a hypomanic state. In the
absence of knowledge of pharmacogenetic predictors of
response, and likely even if these were available, the ulti-
mate value of a particular psychotropic for a patient
may be difficult to predict until after it has been pre-
scribed. Nutraceuticals, such as caffeine, and psychosti-
mulant medications are widely used to enhance
attention and memory, but again the evidence-base to
support the value of newer psychotropics as cognitive
enhancers is currently sparse [29].
In summary, a classical approach to ethics in general,
and to bioethics in particular, attempts to find moral
rules for particular situations. In contrast, a critical
approach argues that values inhere in our ways of life,
and that ethics can’t be algorithmized. An integrative
approach would argue that yes, values inhere in our way
of life but first, these are closely related to our human
nature - many would agree that pain is bad - and sec-
ond they can be reasonably (ie cognitive-affectively)
debated against the backdrop of particular circum-
stances (there are particular contexts in which pain may
in fact be a reasonable choice). We cannot always reach
universal conclusions about the nature of humans in
general, or even the value of psychotropics (good or
bad) in a specific patient. In the more subtle cases of
cosmetic psychopharmacology a lack of ethical conver-
gence is reinforced by a relative absence of empirical
data. Nevertheless, in particular instances we can reach
reasonable decisions - some lives are better than others.
Relevant considerations for moral reasoning-imagining
about enhancements include both the potential value of
stoic acceptance of life’s fate (including imperfections
and aging, day-to-day distress, and idiosyncracies in per-
sonality), as well as the potential value of attempts to
change the hand one is dealt (whether by virtue of phar-
macotherapy, psychotherapy, or non-medical means).
Decisions about whether or not to use psychotropics are
likely to remain controversial and given the relative
complexity and difficulty of such decisions, this is
appropriate.
Three vignettes
With this conceptual framework in mind, let us return
to our 3 vignettes.
a) Adam
From a classical perspective, Adam clearly suffers from a
well-described medical disorder (depression). We can
readily make objective assessments of his abnormal
sense of self, his low mood, and of the effects of particu-
lar antidepressant medications. Fortunately psychiatry
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has been able to demonstrate that depression is asso-
ciated with biochemical disturbances, and that antide-
pressant agents are able to improve symptoms. The
standard moral rules of good medicine apply also in
psychiatry, and there is a clear-cut case for treating
Adam’s medical disorder with modern psychotropic
agents as soon as possible.
From a critical perspective, there are many other ways
of construing Adam. A diagnosis of depression tells us
much about the particular social context of Western
medicine, but relatively little about the nature of the dis-
tress which he is suffering. To understand fully his self,
his mood, and his response to intervention, we need to
address the nature of his circumstances and the mean-
ing of his response. Indeed, this is the role of the clini-
cian; to assist Adam to understand his context, and to
help him construct a response to it. Medicalization of
this process is not necessarily useful, and whatever
approach we take in helping Adam reflects the particu-
larity of our own value system.
From an integrative perspective, we can debate ration-
ally whether or not Adam has a disorder, and similarly
assess the extent to which his self-alteration, mood, and
response to medication are consistent with a MEDICAL
metaphor. Certainly, depression is associated with signif-
icant disability and suffering, and current interventions
are effective and cost-efficient. Furthermore, we increas-
ingly understand the specific structures and mechanisms
which underlie depression, and the way in which inter-
ventions act to normalize such structures and mechan-
isms. While moral decision-making cannot be reduced
to algorithms, neither is it entirely relativistic; a reason-
able decision to treat Adam emerges from a considera-
tion of the relevant data and values.
b) Beth
When it comes to Beth, many have argued that social
anxiety disorder (or social phobia), like depression, is a
medical disorder that deserves clinical intervention.
From a classical perspective, social anxiety disorder
like depression can be thought of in terms of a “chemi-
cal imbalance”. At the same time, critics have argued
that the concept of social anxiety disorder represents
“disease mongering”, that there is no evidence that
social anxiety disorder involves real dysfunction, and
that we need to be sceptical about the need for medi-
cal intervention. Certainly, social anxiety disorder
appears somewhat different from acute depression, in
that it is often a lifelong condition that alters the very
nature of the self. My own view is that there now a
considerable set of data which highlights the suffering
and disability of those with social anxiety disorder,
points to underlying psychobiological alterations, and
emphasizes the efficacy and cost-efficiency of
treatment. Thus an integrated approach supports the
validity of using a MEDICAL metaphor for social anxi-
ety disorder. Such a view is equally accepting of both
pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy.
c) Cliff
A classical view of medicine has tended to focus on dis-
ease rather than on physical or mental well-being. One
reason for this may be the difficulty in finding consen-
sus on what might constitute a decrease in well-being
and in reliably measuring subtle forms of decreased
well-being. There are, however, also ethical arguments
for making a distinction between doctoring (treating
dysfunction) and schmoctering (focusing on enhance-
ment) and avoiding the latter [6]. Some authors [7,8]
argue on the basis of the principles of distributive justice
that society need only provide resources for the former.
Others (bioconservatives) argue that when medicine
focuses on enhancement, it risks upsetting the natural
order of things. In the United States, the President’s
Council on Bioethics has argued that “[T]he naturalness
of means matters. It lies not in the fact that the assisting
drugs or devices are artefacts, but in the danger of vio-
lating or deforming the nature of human agency ... bio-
technology interventions act directly on the human
body and mind to bring about their effects on a passive
subject [9].
From a critical perspective, enhancement technologies,
ranging from cosmetic surgery to cosmetic psychophar-
macology, reinforce particular social constructions and
values. The extension of medicine to include enhance-
ment technologies is consistent with its role in decreas-
ing social deviance, and is problematic insofar as it
focuses on pathology and ignores resilience, overempha-
sizes technology and dehumanizes people, and ignores
our overall physical, psychological, and spiritual well-
being. Some psychotherapies may be useful in fostering
self-knowledge and even self-transcendence [10], and
some psychotropics (eg substances) may be of interest
insofar as they allow an interrogation and deconstruc-
tion of “reality”. However, just as cosmetic surgery rein-
forces particular social values (for example, equating
women’s looks with their value), so cosmetic psycho-
pharmacology acts primarily as a conservative force,
promoting inauthenticity and interfering with self-
understanding. As Murray [11], for example, writes
“Medicine is now the problem of the self; and medicine,
we are told is the necessary solution to the problem - a
problem that this medical discourse has in fact secretly
produced and systematically obscured ...the modern self
remains constrained by a medical morality: I am morally
remiss, my life is a life unworthy of living if I fail to sub-
mit to medical examinations, to doctors’ and psychia-
trists’ recommendations”.
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Williams [12] compares hyper-traditional societies,
where there has been no exposure to contrasting views,
with our modern world, where there is increasing expo-
sure to a range of opinions. In a hyper-traditional
society, there may be little reflexive thought on where
the boundaries of treatment should lie, the natural order
of things is obvious. But since the dawn of the modern
world, the lines between doctoring and schmoctoring
have been open to debate, and ever shifting. An integra-
tive perspective would be wary of any attempt to find a
universal rule that differentiated between treatment and
enhancement, or conversely, that rejected any possibility
of a reasonable decision about where this line should be
drawn. Again, the argument can be made that for any
particular individual, conceptual and empirical work can
help determine what the best intervention is, at any par-
ticular point in time. Still, although advances in biotech-
nology may be useful for a specific individual, the
practices that they bring into play may also come with
important costs.
There is a tension in Western society between values
of self-improvement and self-creation, which would
encourage people to use novel technologies including
medical enhancement, and values around tradition and
nature and about true self-discovery which argue that
such changes are not authentic [6,13]. As Parens writes,
“As one side emphasises our obligation to remember
that life is a gift and that we need to learn to let things
be, the other emphasizes our obligation to transform
that gift and to exhibit our creativity” [14]. In Huxley’s
“Island” the moksha-medicine suggests the possibility of
using medication to enhance authenticity, but in his
“Brave New World” soma serves to illustrate how psy-
chopharmacological enhancement can be dehumanizing
[15]. Given the emphasis that we place on effort in
assigning responsibility for achievement, many view
enhancement as representing diminished agency on the
part of the person whose achievement is enhanced. San-
del, a member of the President’s Council, counter-argues
however that both enhancement technologies, and also
particularly high pressure kinds of parenting (or “hyper-
parenting”), represent not so much a loss of agency, but
rather hyperagency - an aspiration to remake nature,
including human nature [16]. Mastery over nature, and
self-improvement, have obvious benefits. But there is
also the risk that viewing our talents solely as achieve-
ments for which we are responsible, leads to hubris
about ourselves (we are self-made and self-sufficient
rather than merely fortunate), and a lack of solidarity
with others less fortunate (who are deserving of their
fate rather than merely unfortunate) [16].
Johnson has argued persuasively that moral reasoning
is a special case of general (cognitive-affective) reason-
ing, and therefore must rely not so much on algorithmic
rules, as on the use of embodied metaphors [17]. It is
precisely when our concepts of what is natural are chal-
lenged, for example, by new technologies, that the ques-
tion of which metaphor to apply becomes particularly
crucial. Thus, in the case of cosmetic psychopharmacol-
ogy (and other new technologies), we are left with the
question of whether the MEDICAL metaphor of self-
treatment (typically applied when some kind of unna-
tural breakdown occurs) or the MORAL metaphor of
self-discovery (typically applied to everyday or appar-
ently natural life), or a combination of the two, is more
appropriate. Life often presents us with conflicting
moral solutions that cannot be hierarchically ordered by
any universal principle. Those using psychotropics may
find themselves using different metaphors at different
times. Indeed, in medical practice in general, and in cos-
metic psychopharmacology in particular, the right bal-
ance between over-use and under-use of medical
metaphors, remains a matter of judgment.
Routine vaccination and fluoride supplementation are
paradigmatic of health care interventions that are under-
taken in healthy children to strengthen them (rather
than to treat a disorder), and that are now correctly
viewed as good doctoring. Similarly, folic acid is added
to food to prevent neural tube defects in newborns, and
vitamin supplementation may be recommended in some
healthy adults. Although the benefits of such practices
have on balance been enormous, there have been signifi-
cant costs for particular individuals (for example, those
who have serious adverse reactions to vaccination). As
interventions for high cholesterol and high blood pres-
sure have been introduced, and become cheaper, so our
cut-points for deciding who to treat have become less
and less conservative. In the past it has been argued
that antidepressants are only useful in those with major
depression, but there is now evidence that minor disor-
ders are accompanied by significant disability and also
respond to these agents. The risk-benefit of such inter-
ventions can be calculated using statistical measures
such as numbers needed to treat and numbers needed
to harm.
Although the analysis here has focus on disorder, ana-
logous considerations would argue that no essentialist
definition of health is possible, and its boundaries must
be decided as reasonably as possible. The construct of
“well-being” is often a component of our cognitive-affec-
tive maps for decision-making and moral judgments [3],
and may be more relevant to considering “enhance-
ments” rather than “treatments”. Given that humans do
have some design flaws, and given advances in pharma-
ceuticals and psychotropics, it is not unlikely that more
and more of these agents will be appropriately pre-
scribed to more and more people for the purposes of
well-being. It is not at all clear that there is any a priori
Stein Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:5
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/5
Page 9 of 12
ethical reason for rejecting a shift from a hyper-tradi-
tional view of doctoring, and moving to one that allows
the employment of biotechnological advances to
improve well-being [18]. Arguments that such advances
threaten the natural order, for example, may simply
reflect culture-specific views about what sort of condi-
tions are needed for a good life [19].
On the other hand, there may be important costs
associated with this kind of extension of doctoring.
Given how well humans have been designed by evolu-
tion, the difficulties facing innovative science, and the
high placebo response in those who suffer only mild
impairment, it is hard to generate data showing that
interventions to improve physical or psychological well-
being are in fact effective and cost-effective. A growing
empirical literature on happiness and well-being [20]
supports the view that gaining achievement at the cost
of social connectedness is ultimately experienced as dis-
advantageous. Furthermore, raising expectations about
the existence and value of enhancement technologies
may be one of the reasons for the so-called “paradox of
health” in contemporary societies; where populations
that are in fact well, but also well-informed about
pathology, complain more about disorder than unwell
but uninformed groups [21]. Thus, the employment of
biotechnological advances to improve well-being may at
times be bad doctoring.
Neither evolutionary theory, nor blanket ethical prin-
ciples, provide sufficient guidance for deciding on
whether or not to medically intervene. There is general
agreement that prescribing psychotropics for depression
is useful, that providing psychotropics to an abused
woman in order to take away the pain in her current
abusive relationship without supporting attempts to
change or discontinue the relationship is bad doctoring,
and that using steroids with terrible side effects to
enhance athletic performance is bad schmoctoring. On
the other hand, in some cases it would seem good judg-
ment to try an “enhancement” in the hope that it would
in fact serve as a useful “treatment”. This position is
consistent with a realist view that emphasizes an indivi-
dualist approach to clinical decision-making, and that is
neither overly optimistic nor unduly pessimistic about
biotechnological advances.
Just as the media cannot be held wholly responsible
for modern ideals of beauty, so the pharmaceutical
industry cannot be said to have entirely manufactured
our concepts of either psychiatric disorder or mental fit-
ness. On the other hand, just as it is important to inter-
rogate media constructs of beauty and to offer
alternatives, so it is crucial to assess the extent to which
the claims of the pharmaceutical, alternative, and indi-
genous medicines industries and other promoters of
psychotropics go beyond the relevant science, and to
offer a range of alternatives to those who may under-
standably want to use these agents to change their lives
for the better. Psychopharmacology has the potential to
liberate us by reducing the limits imposed on us by dis-
order, but to imprison us by imposing societal demands
[22]. In weighing up alternatives, it is certainly impor-
tant to remember the excesses of past marketing cam-
paigns, and the overoptimism of researchers and
clinicians about novel breakthroughs in psychopharma-
cology [23]. At the same time, and for particular indivi-
duals, at particular times, there is no reason to remain
completely closed to the possibility that a specific psy-
chotropic will turn out to be remarkably helpful. Good
clinical practice invariably involves the kind of equipoise
that comes from successfully balancing the perennial
tensions described in this paper between the objective
and subjective, explanation and understanding, and con-
flicting values.
We now know that specific genetic variants, in inter-
action with particular environments, determine set-
points in various neuronal circuits. We can no longer
infer that all people experience pain or anxiety in the
same way. Similarly, for particular individuals, certain
psychotropics may be useful; people with the val-val
polymorphism of the catechol-0-methyltransferase
(COMT) gene are characterized by lower prefrontal
dopamine levels and worse performance on working
memory tasks, and may do well on certain medications
- whereas people with the met-met COMT polymorph-
ism have higher prefrontal dopamine levels and better
performance, and may respond less well to the same
agents [24]. On the basis of existing cognitive-affective
science it is possible to predict that in the future, physi-
cians and psychopharmacologists will obtain detailed
profiling of patients’ genetic variants, and offer an indi-
vidualized battery of medications and psychotropics.
There is the possibility that this will be done not merely
to reduce conditions such as social anxiety and impul-
sivity, but also to increase well-being and enhance
cognition.
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize the
complexity of our genes and their interactions, the unin-
tended consequences of medication use, and the difficul-
ties of coming up with elixirs that can outdo our
evolutionary design. An intervention that acts on only a
few receptor targets may ultimately affect multiple pro-
cesses in unpredictable ways. Just like the earlier “clini-
cal gaze” [25], so the more recent “molecular gaze”
[11,26] has its limitations. Indeed, despite much back-
slapping about the value of current psychopharmacol-
ogy, there has also been a great deal of exaggeration
[23]. It is notable that currently available medications all
work via only a few mechanisms, reflecting how difficult
it is to make real breakthroughs in our pharmacopoeia.
Stein Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:5
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/5
Page 10 of 12
Similarly, current medications act on a fairly narrow
range of phenomena (primarily mood and anxiety), and
are relatively unhelpful for changing a range of other
traits that may play a role in determining well-being (eg
empathy). Again, to date, it is not yet clear that available
agents are better than, say, caffeine, or exercise, as cog-
nitive enhancers. Thus, despite the already widespread
use of psychotropics to improve well-being and enhance
cognition, only time will tell how valuable for humans
the field of cosmetic psychopharmacology will ultimately
be.
The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)
deserve particular mention, as they have been key to
this debate since the work of Kramer [27]. It should be
emphasized that to date there is relatively little empirical
data on the use of psychotropics such as SSRIs in
healthy volunteers. It is interesting that some controlled
research demonstrates subtle changes in emotional pro-
cessing and social behaviour in normals, sometimes out-
side of the awareness of subjects. Nevertheless, closer
examination of such phenomena, as well as of the use of
SSRIs in those with more significant symptomatology
(even if it did not meet criteria for “major depression”
or similar disorders) would be necessary to determine
whether it was worthwhile or not. Currently there is
insufficient evidence to argue that administration of an
SSRI to healthy subjects results in increased well-being
[28]. Conversely, there is some evidence that SSRIs can
flip predisposed people into a hypomanic state. In the
absence of knowledge of pharmacogenetic predictors of
response, and likely even if these were available, the ulti-
mate value of a particular psychotropic for a patient
may be difficult to predict until after it has been pre-
scribed. Nutraceuticals, such as caffeine, and psychosti-
mulant medications are widely used to enhance
attention and memory, but again the evidence-base to
support the value of newer psychotropics as cognitive
enhancers is currently sparse [29].
In summary, a classical approach to ethics in general,
and to bioethics in particular, attempts to find moral
rules for particular situations. In contrast, a critical
approach argues that values inhere in our ways of life,
and that ethics can’t be algorithmized. An integrative
approach would argue that yes, values inhere in our way
of life but first, these are closely related to our human
nature - many would agree that pain is bad - and sec-
ond they can be reasonably (ie cognitive-affectively)
debated against the backdrop of particular circum-
stances (there are particular contexts in which pain may
in fact be a reasonable choice). We cannot always reach
universal conclusions about the nature of humans in
general, or even the value of psychotropics (good or
bad) in a specific patient. In the more subtle cases of
cosmetic psychopharmacology a lack of ethical
convergence is reinforced by a relative absence of
empirical data. Nevertheless, in particular instances we
can reach reasonable decisions - some lives are better
than others. Relevant considerations for moral reason-
ing-imagining about enhancements include both the
potential value of stoic acceptance of life’s fate (includ-
ing imperfections and aging, day-to-day distress, and
idiosyncracies in personality), as well as the potential
value of attempts to change the hand one is dealt
(whether by virtue of pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy,
or non-medical means). Decisions about whether or not
to use psychotropics are likely to remain controversial
and given the relative complexity and difficulty of such
decisions, this is appropriate.
Concluding notes on the method
In trying to formulate a conceptual framework, rather
than attempting to resolve well-known philosophical
debates in their own terms, I have asked whether an
integrative approach that uses some constructs drawn
from various proponents, can be supported by data
from contemporary cognitive-affective science. Although
this would not be a widely accepted approach, many
have argued that philosophy must increasingly address
scientific data. An approach which emphasizes the value
of scientific data has perhaps won the battle for ques-
tions about the ultimate nature of matter, where philo-
sophy in the absence of physics is no longer acceptable
[30]. Similarly, there is growing interest in empirical
epistemology (or neurophilosophy) [31,32], and the inte-
gration of science with ethics (or neuroethics) [33,34].
Any attempt to include a whole range of thinkers
under a simple rubric (such as “classical” or “critical”)
must fail, and the aim of the contrasts drawn here is to
attempt to show some family resemblances, rather than
to stake out necessary and sufficient criteria for belong-
ing to divergent schools of thought. Indeed, prototypes
and metaphors may be useful not only in day-to-day
life, but also lie at the heart of many of our most sophis-
ticated scientific and philosophical constructs. Thus,
good scientists use a mixture of conceptual thinking,
empirical data and scientific values to make judgments
about when to shift paradigms or change classifications.
Analogously, Johnson [17] has argued that the concept
of morality is itself a radial category. Again, good clini-
cians use a mixture of conceptual thinking, empirical
data and scientific values to make judgments about
when to use the medical model and offer treatment.
Indeed, the categories of “classical” and “critical” may
themselves reflect everyday mappings of crucial differ-
ences between notions of objective-disease/explanatory-
cause/medical-treatment versus subjective-illness/under-
standing-reason/moral-acceptance - between choosing a
MEDICAL and a MORAL metaphor. It is comforting,
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perhaps, that there is a certain consistency to the
approach here; the strategy of relying on the relevant
data from cognitive-affective science is compatible with
a view that is sceptical of formal definitions of con-
structs, and also with the idea of using philosophical
constructs as bootstraps to help conceptualize data and
to reach valid explanations of the world.
Psychiatric disorders comprise a large portion of the
global burden of disease, and there are ongoing efforts
to find effective and cost-efficient treatments. Neverthe-
less, psychiatry has been accused of being either brain-
less or mindless [35], with conceptual underpinnings
that are often simplistic or dualist [36]. This paper tries
to work towards providing a more sophisticated account
that integrates a range of perennial conceptual tensions
in the field (objectivity/subjectivity, explanation/under-
standing, absolutism/relativism), and so to assist the
important goal of putting psychiatry and psychopharma-
cology on firmer footing.
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